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ABSTRACT
We study how the trajectory of health for the near-elderly uninsured changes upon enrolling into
Medicare at the age of 65.  We find that Medicare increases the probability of the previously
uninsured having excellent or very good health, decreases their probability of being in good health,
and has no discernable effects at lower health levels.  Surprisingly, we found Medicare had a similar
effect on health for the previously insured.  This suggests that Medicare helps the relatively healthy
65 year olds, but does little for those who are already in declining health once they reach the age of
65.  The improvement in health between the uninsured and insured were not statistically different
from each other.  The stability of insurance coverage afforded by Medicare may be the source of the
health benefit suggesting that universal coverage at other ages may have similar health effects.  
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I. Introduction 
The Medicare program provides near universal health insurance coverage for Americans over the 
age of 65, while those under 65 are predominantly reliant on employer-sponsored health 
insurance for affordable health insurance coverage.  The substantial gaps in coverage resulting 
from the employer-based system are partially filled by individually purchased policies and public 
insurance (primarily Medicaid), but 18% of the non-elderly, 45.5 million people in 2004, remain 
without health insurance. Because health insurance reduces the financial barriers of using the 
medical system to maintain or prevent the deterioration of health, the uninsured may experience 
indirect negative consequences to their health as a result of health care foregone from a lack of 
incentives for obtaining medical care (Institute of Medicine, 2001).  Because the near-elderly 
uninsured obtain health insurance through the Medicare program at the age of 65, they may 
experience a health benefit from this transition.   The goal of this paper is to determine the effect 
of the Medicare program on the health of the near-elderly uninsured. 
 
Understanding whether there is a health benefit to the near-elderly uninsured from the Medicare 
program is an important aspect of policy debates regarding expanding and contracting Medicare 
coverage.  As we approach the year 2018 -- when the Medicare trust fund reserves are projected 
to be exhausted (Trustees of the Social Security and Medicare trust funds, 2006) – policy 
changes to Medicare may become necessary.  The near-elderly uninsured may be particularly 
vulnerable to any contraction in Medicare coverage because Medicare arrives at an age when 
treatable health conditions are emerging at an increasing rate.  Despite the importance of health 
insurance for this age group, 25% of the near-elderly will experience a period without health 
insurance between ages 55 and 65 (Baker et al., 2005). This may be partially due to the fact that 
affordable coverage is difficult to find for those lacking health insurance with existing or 
emerging health conditions. Although all are guaranteed an issue of a health insurance policy in 
the individual market through the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA), the law does not limit the amount insurers can charge for such coverage. Hence, 
premium levels can exceed the financial resources of all but the wealthiest individuals. As a 
result, several policy proposals have emerged to address this vulnerable group including 
expansions in the Medicare program to cover the uninsured in the 55 to 65 age group. 
Understanding the direct and indirect benefits of providing health insurance to the near-elderly   5 
uninsured can help inform these policies. The health effects of policies specifically aimed to 
provide insurance to the near-elderly uninsured have not been established.  
  
In this paper, we use a quasi-experimental approach to establish the health effects of insurance 
for the near-elderly uninsured.  Those who acquire health insurance typically do so for a reason: 
they may have gained employment that offers coverage; they may have qualified for coverage 
from the federal government as a result of poverty or disability; or they may have purchased 
insurance in the individual market. In all of these cases, the decision to purchase health insurance 
may be related to recent and projected changes in health status, making it difficult to empirically 
assess the health effects of acquiring insurance using cross-sectional comparisons. In contrast, 
uninsured persons who turn 65 acquire health insurance through the Medicare program simply 
by aging in. Therefore, by using panel data to assess how gaining Medicare coverage at age 65 
changes the health trajectory of the near-elderly uninsured as they age into their late 60s and 
early 70s, we can identify how insurance changes the trajectory of health for this group. 
 
II.  Literature on Health Insurance and Health 
The Institute of Medicine Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance examined the 
relationship between being uninsured and the health of American adults (Institute of Medicine, 
2002). The Committee concluded that if the roughly 30 million working-age uninsured 
Americans were to become continuously insured, their health would be expected to improve. The 
studies on general health supporting these conclusions find that being uninsured for relatively 
short periods (1 to 4 years) appears to result in a decrease in general health status (Baker et al., 
2001) and that uninsured adults followed for 5 to 17 years are at higher risk of premature death 
than are persons with private coverage (Franks et al., 1993; Sorlie et al., 1994). Hundreds of 
other studies have also documented a disparity in morbidity between the uninsured and the 
insured (Literature reviews: Brown et al., 1998; Hadley, 2003; Institute of Medicine, 2002). 
From these studies, however, it is difficult to determine the causal relation between health 
insurance and health for several reasons. A positive association between health insurance and 
health may reflect the effects of health on health insurance (reverse causation) or the effects of 
some other unobserved attribute on both health insurance and health (selection) (Levy and 
Meltzer, 2004).   6 
 
The only experimental study of the effect of insurance on health was the RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment (HIE). Between 1974 and 1982, the HIE randomly assigned roughly 2,000 
families to one of 14 experimental health plans that varied in their cost-sharing arrangements 
(Newhouse et al., 1981; Newhouse et al., 1993). Although the study found sizable effects of 
more generous health insurance on use and expenditures, effects on health status were more 
modest. For low-income persons with high blood pressure, free care brought an improvement in 
blood pressure control. Vision also improved among those with poor vision. No significant 
effects were detected on eight other measures of health status and health habits for adults (Brook 
et al., 1983). The absence of a health effect could be due to the presence of a cap on out-of-
pocket health expenditures by all enrollees that was, at most, 15% of income (Newhouse et al., 
1993). This randomized social experiment is of limited use for our purposes because (1) it did 
not include a study group with no health insurance; (2) it excluded the Medicare-eligible 
population and thus excluded the elderly population; and (3) the health care delivery system and 
medicine have both changed substantially since the mid to late seventies.  
 
By exploiting a natural experiment from a change in the eligibility of pregnant women for 
Medicaid benefits, a few quasi-experimental studies have provided evidence of a causal relation 
between health insurance and health of newborns (Joyce, 1998; Epstein and Newhouse, 1998; 
Baldwin et al., 1998; Ray et al., 1997; Currie and Gruber, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Reichman and 
Florio, 1995; Haas et al., 1993; Fossett et al., 1992; Buescher et al., 1991; Piper et al., 1990). The 
findings generally suggest that health insurance does result in modest reductions in infant 
mortality.  
 
More recently, quasi-experimental designs have been applied to the question of health and health 
insurance around the introduction of Medicare. Decker and Rapaport (2002) found that mortality 
decreased significantly after women diagnosed with early breast cancer acquired Medicare. 
Finkelstein and McKnight (2005) reported that the establishment of Medicare in 1965 had no 
discernible impact on the mortality of the elderly in the 10 years following Medicare’s 
enactment.  
   7 
The hypothesized mechanism by which health effects might occur is through increased or more 
timely use of medical services with insurance and Medicare. The HIE provides direct 
experimental evidence that a reduction in out-of-pocket costs increases utilization and 
expenditures for health care services (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse et al., 1993). Several 
recent observational studies provide strong evidence of the increased use of medical services due 
to Medicare. State hospital discharge datasets have also been used to assess how Medicare might 
alter medical service use (Lichtenberg, 2002; Card et al., 2004). These studies have found that 
utilization rates for doctor visits and hospitalizations (particularly hospitalizations for 
discretionary conditions) increase at age 65, the cusp of Medicare eligibility. McWilliams et al. 
(2003), using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), found a jump in preventive care 
utilization between just before and just after age 65. Because so many medical procedures have 
been found to reduce risks of death and disability (Aiken and Bays, 1984; Cassel et al., 1999; 
Fuchs, 1999; McClellan and Noguchi, 1998), the assertion that Medicare and other forms of 
health insurance that improved access to medical care has helped Americans live longer, 
healthier, and more independent lives is compelling.  
 
Yet no study has looked directly at how the introduction of Medicare may change the health 
trajectory of the previously uninsured using individual-level data. We hypothesize that the health 
trajectory of previously uninsured persons will improve as a result of the introduction of 
Medicare at age 65. The mechanism for this change would be the greater use of medical care 
induced by subsidized, universal health insurance coverage.  There may also be 
contemporaneous changes occurring at this age. The most obvious are the higher rates of 
retirement and the introduction of Social Security payments at age 65. Because of these other 
changes occurring simultaneously, we will also test whether the health trajectory of the 
previously uninsured changes by more than that of the previously insured.  
  
III. Conceptual and Empirical Framework 
Health insurance and medical care exist to maintain and improve health, and to guard against the 
financial risks associated with poor health. Health can be viewed as an asset that has a natural 
rate of deterioration over time. A medical event can hasten that deterioration. Medical care is 
used after a medical event to restore, maintain, or prevent further decline in health (Grossman,   8 
1972). The expenditure for this medical care is sometimes large and unexpected. Insurance 
reduces the financial risk associated with higher medical expenses after a health event. Health 
insurance plays other important roles in this relationship, including allowing access to health care 
that would otherwise be unaffordable (de Meza 1983, Nyman, 1999) and increasing demand for 
medical care because the person using health care with insurance typically does not pay the 
entire cost of that care (Pauly, 1968).  
 
Determining whether the additional medical care afforded by the introduction of health insurance 
affects health may be complicated by adverse selection: the decision to acquire or to drop health 
insurance is often related to one’s health status (sometimes this is not a decision – it happens 
because a person involuntarily loses their job with employment-based benefits). For example, 
one could acquire health insurance before seeing the doctor for an emerging health problem. 
Unless the health status factors that led to the change in insurance status are perfectly controlled 
for, assessing causality in the empirical evaluation of the relationship between change in health 
insurance status and health status is problematic because the effects of the unmeasured or 
mismeasured aspects of poor health may be attributed to being insured.  
 
The empirical framework in this paper focuses on the introduction of Medicare insurance at age 
65, where the introduction of government-subsidized health insurance for previously uninsured 
persons occurs independently of any underlying health status change other than aging one more 
year. Because government policy restricts entry into Medicare until age 65 for most Americans, 
those who take up Medicare insurance (at age 65, but not those before age 65) do so for reasons 
other than changes in health status. It is the introduction of health insurance at age 65 for no 
other reason than turning this age that creates the natural experiment used in our key 
comparisons.  
 
A stylized version of our model is expressed as 
0 1 2 3 4 H U M U*M Age D =b +b +b +b +b  
where ￿H is the change in health status between age and age+2, U is an indicator of whether the 
subject is uninsured prior to age 65, M is an indicator for the age the subjects is enrolled in 
Medicare.  We can determine from the estimated coefficients the average change in health status   9 
( H D ) in the pre-Medicare and post-Medicare period for both the Uninsured and the Insured 
groups: ￿HUpre=￿0+ ￿1, ￿HUpost=￿0+ ￿1+ ￿2+ ￿3, ￿HIpre=￿0, and ￿HIpost=￿0+ ￿2.  To simplify the 
notation, we refer to these four  H D groups as Upre, Upost, Ipre, and Ipost.  They are depicted as 
slopes in Figure 1.  From H D , we can estimate the change in the rate of health decline after the 
introduction of Medicare for the Uninsured and Insured groups (￿U and ￿I, respectively) by 
subtracting the pre change from the post change (i.e. ￿U= Upost-Upre; ￿I= Ipost-Ipre).  Finally, we 
estimate the change in the rate of health decline for the Uninsured using the Insured group as a 
control by ￿U-￿I.   Note that while, for simplicity, the graph depicts no intercept change at 65, 
our modeling does allow for this. 
 
This experimental opportunity at age 65 is not exact for two reasons. First, initial insurance 
status is not randomly assigned, which could bias our findings: certain factors, such as low 
socioeconomic status, can cause poor health and lower rates of health insurance coverage. With 
the first-difference approach, baseline health differences between the insured and uninsured 
(both observed and unobserved differences) are removed. By controlling for the characteristics 
of the groups, we control for differences in the rate of change in health status due to differences 
in these characteristics. Second, other changes confounded with health status may also occur at 
age 65, including retirement and Social Security payments. We consider the change in trajectory 
of the insured as a proxy for these and other contemporaneous changes. We also directly 
consider how sensitive our comparisons are to the time-dependent (but potentially endogenous) 
retirement status and Social Security payments.   
 
IV.  Data 
The data were obtained from the original age-eligible cohort of the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS). The HRS began in 1992 as a national longitudinal study of the noninstitutionalized 
population born between 1931 and 1941 (i.e., persons age 51 to 61 at the time of the baseline 
survey) and their spouses. Respondents and their spouses have been reinterviewed every 2 years 
since. The investigators used a complex sample design in which black persons, Hispanic persons, 
and residents of Florida were oversampled. The initial age-eligible sample was 9,771. We use all 
biannual waves from 1992 to 2004. Figure 2 describes the aging of the original sample at each 
wave.   10 
 
Our study sample includes birth cohorts 1932-1937 (grey shading in Figure 2). These birth 
cohorts have the potential to be observed at age 59/60 and then being observed at least twice 
upon reaching the age of 65.  By using the same participants for the pre- and post-eligibility 
periods removes the possibility of a birth cohort effect; we excluded the 1938-1941 birth cohorts 
for this reason.  Starting all individuals when they are 59/60 removes the possibility of left-
censoring bias that would result from a differential death rate by insurance status and age cohort; 
to avoid this, we excluded the 1931 cohort and started following the included birth cohorts at age 
59/60. As a result, we studied the 1932-1937 birth cohorts (N = 5,086).  
 
We also excluded persons who dropped out or died before age 59/60 (n = 226), those with 
missing insurance status (n = 55), the few persons who reported never receiving Medicare after 
age 65 (n = 31), those with no follow-up after age 59/60 (n = 127), and those on Medicare or 
Medicaid at age 59/60 (n = 572). We used sensitivity analysis to test the influence of this last 
exclusion. Our final study sample consists of 4,075 persons (Table 1). 
 
In each wave, HRS respondents provided detailed information about their current insurance 
coverage. They were asked whether they received any employment-based coverage, individual 
coverage, and coverage through federal programs such as Medicare or Medicaid. The uninsured 
are defined as those whose response indicated they had no form of private or public insurance. 
Those uninsured at age 59/60 represent the uninsured group and those insured at age 59/60 
represent the insured group. The insured group consists of 3,484 persons, and the uninsured 
group consists of 591 persons (Table 2). Everyone is insured through Medicare once they cross 
the age 65 threshold, but the analytical labels for our comparison groups are held fixed according 
to their insurance status at age 59/60. The percentage of uninsured persons drops from 14.5% to 
14.0% between the pre and post period because of the higher death rate in the uninsured group. 
 
However, switching between insured and uninsured states is possible before age 65. In fact, 9.7% 
of the sample switched from insured to uninsured or from uninsured to insured between 59/60 
and 63/64. Because our interest is determining whether health is a consequence of one’s 
insurance status, we would like the definition of insurance status to not be a consequence of a   11 
health event. Therefore, our primary analysis is based on the initial insurance status (i.e. 
insurance status at age 59/60).  In a sensitivity analysis, we compare the group continuously 
insured and the group continuously uninsured.  
 
While wave-specific overall response rates average 88.6%, persons who are uninsured are more 
likely to be lost to follow-up than persons who are insured. The HRS sample weights account for 
attrition (in addition to the complex sample design) through a post-stratification of the HRS to 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) by age, sex, race, ethnicity, and marital status groups. This 
stratification explains differential non-response over time by those major demographic groups. 
Because differential attrition by insurance status remained, we used the CPS to apply an 
additional adjustment to the HRS weights by age, race, labor force status, education, and 
insurance status to arrive at our final weights.  The details of this adjustment are provided in the 
technical appendix.  These adjusted weights are used in all analyses. 
 
The primary outcome measure is self-reported health status combined with mortality. The former 
is measured by the question, “Would you say that your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, 
or poor?” Mortality is reported by surviving family members or other contacts, and non-reported 
mortality is obtained through a link of the HRS files with the National Death Index. Self-reported 
health status has been used as a measure of health for many previous studies that related 
insurance coverage to health outcomes (Fihn and Wicher, 1988; Hafner-Eaton, 1993; Lurie et al., 
1984; Short and Lair, 1994) and has been shown to have predictive validity for both future health 
care utilization and subsequent mortality (Manning et al., 1987; DeSalvo, 2006). Due to the 
small sample sizes on the extremes of this scale, we combine the excellent and very good health 
into a single category, and the fair and poor categories into another category.  
 
The primary control variables include sex, age, education, ethnicity, race, and region. Baseline 
marital status, income, and wealth and time-varying covariates of retirement status, receipt of 
Social Security payments, and marital status are included as explanatory variables in sensitivity 
analysis only because these variables may be considered endogenous. Wealth and income 
measures are converted to 2004 real U.S. dollars adjusted by the Consumer Price Index.    12 
Retirement status is based on self-reported categories of not retired, fully retired, partially retired, 
or not applicable. 
 
V. Empirical Model 
We estimate health state transitions between health state at age t (Ht) and the health state at age 
t+2 (Ht+2), one survey wave later.  Ht+2 is a categorical variable with four categories: j = 
(excellent/very good (E), good (G), fair/poor (F), and died (D)). The transitions from Ht to Ht+2 
are estimated by using the following multinomial logit model: 
 
ij
ij0 ij1 t ij2 t ij3 t ij4 t t ij5 t t ij6 t t
iE
ij7 t t t ij8 t ijn n
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where pij is the probability of being in health state category j for participant i at age t+2 given his 
or her health and other characteristics:  ij t 1 t t p pr(H j|H i;age ;X) + = = = . A more traditional fixed 
effect model of health state would not be appropriate because death is one of the states and it is 
an absorbing state.  While we considered an ordered logit specification for this model because 
our measure of health status is ordered, we abandoned this approach because of the poor 
performance of this model on the Brant test and the fact that the multinomial logit generally 
passed the revised Hosmer-Lemeshow test, while the ordered logit universally failed this test.  
(The details of our specification tests are provided in the technical appendix.) 
 
To provide interpretability from the large number of estimated relevant coefficients in our 
multinomial logit model, we simulate how the estimated health transitions will change health for 
U and I as the subjects in these groups age.  The simulation is conducted as follows.  First, we 
start with the sample when they are 59/60.  We then use the estimated coefficients from the 
health transition model to predict their probability of being in each of the four health states at 
61/62.  Each subject’s realized health state at 61/62 is then determined from a random draw from 
a uniform distribution on the unit interval.  We then repeat this process using the predicted health 
states at 61/62 as their baseline health state for the prediction of the probability of being in each 
of the four health states at 63/64.  This process is repeated until each subject is aged to 71/72.  
Those subjects who enter the dead state are treated as dead for all remaining ages in the   13 
simulation and are dropped from the repeated predictions for subsequent ages.  In addition to 
simulating the health of subjects as they age onto Medicare, we simulate the health of subjects as 
they age from 65 to 71 assuming they did not receive Medicare.  This out-of-sample simulation 
is performed by not “turning on M” for ages beyond 65. 
 
The simulation is similar to a Markov chain, but instead of using average transition probabilities 
and averages for initial conditions, the Markov process is conducted at the individual level.  This 
allows for unique transition probabilities for each individual’s covariates.  This greatly simplifies 
the process when the time dependent covariates of retirement status and Social Security 
payments are added to the model.   However, random variation enters because realized states are 
based on a random draw.  This variation is reduced because we repeat the simulation 100 times 
for each individual. 
 
When the simulation is complete, the average proportion of subjects in each health state at each 
age for each insurance group is estimated as well as for the counterfactual post period of U and I.  
We then estimate the change in health state over a 6-year period for each insurance group (i.e. 
Upre, Ipre, Upost, Ipost) by subtracting the health state probability at age 71 from the health state 
probability at age 65. The difference-in-difference for each insurance group (￿U and ￿I) is 
defined as the difference in a 6-year change in health state caused by Medicare enrollment at age 
65 ((Upost – Upre) and (Ipost – Ipre)). Finally, the difference between these two differences gives 
the change in health status caused by Medicare enrollment at age 65 for the uninsured, 
controlling for any contemporaneous changes in health over time.   These calculations are 
depicted graphically in Figure 3. 
 
We estimated standard errors and significance in the multinomial logit using robust standard 
errors (White, 1980), correcting for clustering at the person level.  We estimated confidence 
intervals of the health state probabilities estimated in the simulation using the percentile method 
from a non-parametric clustered bootstrap. The cluster was at the individual level to maintain the 
serial correlation pattern at the individual level without assuming an explicit form for the 
autocorrelation (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).  
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We then estimate the base model for several important subgroups: continuous insurance groups, 
by gender, for low income and low wealth, and for those with and without supplemental 
insurance.  Low income (wealth) group is defined as those with income (wealth) below the 
median in that wave when 59/60.  For the 1996 wave, this translates into income below $46,000 
and wealth below $156,000 in 2000 dollars.  Supplemental insurance is defined as any additional 
insurance to Medicare.  This includes employer-sponsored insurance, individual insurance, a 
MediGap plan, VA Champus, and Medicaid.  Finally, we perform several robustness checks.  
We explore whether the results are robust to additional control variables such as time-dependent 
labor force participation and Social Security payments, to alternative age specifications, to 
alternative health status categorizations, and to weighting.  
 
VI. Results 
Table 3 shows the baseline characteristics of the study sample by insurance status. The insured 
and uninsured groups in the HRS at age 59/60 are representative of these groups in the United 
States. The uninsured are more likely to be in fair or poor health, are less likely to work, have 
lower education and lower income, and are more likely to be African American or Hispanic. 
Although the uninsured are more likely to have diabetes and psychiatric problems and to visit the 
hospital, they are less likely to visit the doctor. 
 
Table 4 shows the coefficients of the multinomial regression coefficients, with the excellent/very 
good group being treated as the reference category. The tests of significance for key groups of 
variables are displayed at the bottom of the table.  Here we see that the health of the uninsured is 
different from that of the insured in the pre-and post-Medicare periods.  The health status 
differences before and after Medicare within insurance group approaches significance at the .05 
level.  The difference in the rates of change pre- vs. post-Medicare between the uninsured and 
insured is not statistically significant.   
 
To better understand the direction of these health changes, we turn to the simulated trajectories 
depicted in Figure 4. In the northwest quadrant we see the trajectory for the excellent/very good 
health status.  The darker lines represent the uninsured group trajectory and the lighter lines 
represent the insured group trajectory.  The uninsured trajectory is below the insured trajectory   15 
representing their inferior health.  Both lines decline with age representing deteriorating health 
with age and the monotonically increasing probability of being in the dead health state.  At age 
65 there is a kink in the trajectories which represents the change in the rate of health decline post 
Medicare enrollment.  The dashed line is the pre-65 trajectory, based on the pre-65 transition 
probabilities, extended into the post-65 ages.  The divergence between the two lines for each 
insurance group represents the effect of Medicare on that insurance group.  Here we see the 
increase in the likelihood of excellent/very good health with Medicare for both the uninsured and 
insured groups.  The divergence is greater for the uninsured group.  The other panels show the 
trajectories for the other health status categories.  It is notable that by age 71 the fair/poor 
trajectories for the insured and uninsured groups converge.  
 
As a check on the fit of our model and our simulation to the raw data on health status for our 
sample, we graphically display the raw trajectories with the trajectories from our fitted data in 
Figure 5.  This dramatically demonstrates the remarkable fit of our model. 
 
Table 5 displays the simulated incremental effects between health trajectories. In column [E] we 
see that for every 100 persons in the uninsured group, from age 65 to 71 the introduction of 
Medicare at age 65 leads to 7.7 more uninsured people reporting excellent or very good health, 
6.1 fewer reporting good health, 3.7 fewer reporting fair or poor health, and 2.2 more are dead. 
The changes are statistically significant for the excellent/very good group, suggested by the 
exclusion of 0 in the reported 95% confidence interval. Similar but weaker patterns are observed 
for the insured group from age 65 to 71, where the introduction of Medicare at 65 leads to 5.9 
more insured people reporting excellent or very good health, 5.1 fewer reporting good health, 1.0 
fewer reporting fair or poor health, and 0.2 more are dead (column [F]). Medicare at age 65 
appears to delay the erosion of excellent or very good health. For the uninsured group, the 
deterioration of health prevented is one that would have resulted in good, fair, or poor health. For 
the insured group, the deterioration of health prevented is one that would have resulted in good 
health. We could not detect a significant survival effect of Medicare at age 65.  
 
The comparisons between the insured and uninsured groups in column [G] show 1.8 more 
reporting excellent or very good health in the uninsured group and 2.8 fewer reporting fair or   16 
poor in the uninsured group.  Although not statistically significant, this does suggest that 
providing health insurance to the uninsured does has a modest health effect.  
 
Table 6 displays results for various subgroups. There is a similar pattern when the analysis is 
limited to the continuously insured and the continuously uninsured.  The uninsured enrolling into 
Medicare appears to have a slightly greatest positive influence on women compared with men in 
terms of the gain in excellent/very good health. The comparisons in the low-income and low-
wealth groups look remarkably similar to the overall result.  Finally, we compare the subgroup of 
those with supplemental versus those without supplemental insurance.  The rates of death 
increase for both subgroups because those who died before 65 were dropped from both 
subgroups because supplemental status could not be determined.  The relative difference 
between the uninsured and insured is greater for the uninsured who also obtain supplemental 
insurance.   
 
Table 7 presents the sensitivity of the results to various alternatives.  The results are insensitive 
to changes in retirement status, changes in marital status, or the introduction of Social Security 
payments suggesting that the difference within the insured and uninsured groups cannot be 
attributed to these often contemporaneous changes at age 65.  The results are insensitive to 
alternative age specifications.  Our main concern is that our use of a quadratic age specification 
was not appropriately capturing the non-linear trajectory of health status with age. In this series 
of robustness checks, we find almost no non-linear pattern of health status changes and age. The 
three alternative age specifications considered (i.e., 2a, 2b, and 2c in Table 7) are nearly identical 
to the base model, suggesting that we have appropriately specified the age/health trajectory.  
Panel 3 in Table 7 shows the model when the five living health states are not collapsed into three 
living health states. The three health states used in the base model potentially mask some 
differences between the excellent and very good health states, and between the fair and poor 
health states, but the smaller sample sizes in the finer categories leads to less precise estimates.  
Generally, the combined groups are a fair representation of the more specific patterns in this 
panel.  When the five categories of health status in the multinomial logit but summarizes the 
results in the same way as the base model. Here the results are similar to the base model. 
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Panel 4 in Table 7 shows the results excluding the weights.  The weighting slightly increases the 
additional number of persons with excellent/very good health and this increase is greater in the 
uninsured group. Given the greater rates of attrition among the uninsured, the weighted estimate 
offers an appropriate adjustment for the observable attrition differences between groups.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
Because the number of near elderly is rising rapidly and there are few affordable alternatives for 
health insurance for those who lack access to employment-based coverage, the uninsured near-
elderly are of growing concern.  We find that providing Medicare to the near-elderly uninsured 
increases their probability of being in excellent or very good health, decreases their probability 
of being in good health, and has no statistically significant effects at lower health levels.  
Surprisingly, we found Medicare had the same pattern of effect on the health of the previously 
insured.  This suggests that Medicare helps the relatively healthy 65 year olds, but may do little 
for those who are already in declining health once they reach the age of 65.  The improvement in 
health from Medicare for the uninsured was not statistically different from the improvement in 
health from Medicare for the insured.  However, the direction of the statistically insignificant 
effect is suggestive of a greater health effect for the previously uninsured.   
 
Our evidence of Medicare improving the health status for the uninsured is consistent with 
evidence that the lack of health insurance in the period immediately preceding Medicare 
eligibility is associated with faster declines in health (Baker et al., 2001; Dor, Sudano, and Baker, 
2006) and suggests that Medicare may attenuate the rapid health declines of the uninsured.  It is 
also consistent with the conclusions of Hadley and Waidmann (2006) who, using an instrumental 
variables analysis approach with pre-65 HRS data only, summarize their findings as suggesting 
that extending insurance coverage to the near-elderly uninsured would result in an increase in the 
proportion of people at age 65 in excellent and very good health.  Yet, as pointed out in a 
commentary by Kronick (2006), the magnitude of the health changes found in Hadley and 
Waidmann (much larger than those found here) seem implausible.  Part of this may be due to 
issues with the appropriateness of their instruments, but part may be due to their use of an 
inappropriate instrumental variables estimator for nonlinear estimators for endogenous 
categorical health status and dependent variables (Newey, 1987; Terza, 2006).  Another possible   18 
explanation for the differences between their results and ours is their use of an ordered logit.  As 
our Technical Appendix indicates, these data reject that specification of the model.  Moreover, 
Finkelstein and McKnight (2005) found, using aggregate data, that the establishment of 
Medicare had no discernible impact on the mortality of the elderly in the decade after the 
enactment of Medicare.  
 
The potential for health improvements for the uninsured is supported by the evidence that use of 
medical services rises dramatically after enrollment into Medicare and that the increase is greater 
for those who become insured when they are eligible for Medicare than for those who were 
insured before Medicare enrollment. This effect of Medicare on health service use may be the 
mechanism for the positive effects on health status.  Yet this mechanism is not entirely consistent 
with our finding that health status also improved for those who enrolled into Medicare at age 65 
and were insured before this age.  To be consistent with an improvement in health for both the 
previously insured and previously uninsured, the mechanism would have to include aspects of 
the Medicare program that are different from insurance obtained in the private market.  For 
example, Medicare offers a more stable source of health insurance which may itself have a health 
advantage because the decision to leave work when one is recovering from an illness may 
improve recovery (Bradley et al., 2005). This might outweigh the possibility that insurance 
coverage under Medicare may be less generous, on average, when compared to employer-
sponsored health insurance, even in the presence of private supplemental coverage that is 
obtained by many Medicare beneficiaries.   If, in fact, the stability of insurance coverage 
afforded by Medicare is the source of the health benefit, universal coverage at other ages may 
have similar health effects.   
 
An alternative explanation for health improvements at 65 would be if health changes resulted 
from contemporaneous changes at age 65, such as retirement and Social Security payments.  
Because the majority initiate retirement and social security prior to 65, rather than 
contemporaneous with Medicare eligibility, we were able to separately identify these events and 
add controls for initiation of retirement and Social Security.  This alternative explanation was not 
supported by our data because when we added these controls, the changes to health observed at 
Medicare eligibility remained.  Another alternative may be that the observed changes in health   19 
status could be attributed to subjective responses to the health status question.  This study is 
limited by its use of self-reported health status rather than objectively determined health status 
measures.  Further research into the mechanisms generating the effects measured in this paper is 
still needed.   
 
We find that Medicare does improve the health of the uninsured and the insured, but only for the 
relatively healthy.  This suggests that there are health benefits of universal coverage and that 
extending this coverage to much earlier ages may increase the proportion of the population who 
arrive at the age of 65 in excellent or very good health.  It also suggests that Medicare itself may 
be providing health benefits to the population.  When considering the value of health insurance, 
however, health is only one important aspect.  Health insurance is designed to provide financial 
security to families by protecting them from potentially devastating financial consequences that 
can result from unexpected health care expenses (Himmelstein, et al., 2005).  The more direct 
financial justification for health insurance should not be forgotten as we seek to better understand 
its indirect health consequences.   
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Figure 1.  Model of health effect at 65
Health
Ipre
        Ipost
Upre ￿I=Upost-Upre
        Upost
￿U=Upost-Upre
65 Age  
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Figure 2. Ages in Pre and Post Group Samples
birth SURVEY YEAR
year 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
(AGE IN SURVEY YEAR IS LISTED BELOW)
1941 51 53 55 57 59 61 63
1940 52 54 56 58 60 62 64
1939 53 55 57 59 61 63 65
1938 54 56 58 60 62 64 66
1937 55 57 59 61 63 65 67
1936 56 58 60 62 64 66 68
1935 57 59 61 63 65 67 69
1934 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
1933 59 61 63 65 67 69 71
1932 60 62 64 66 68 70 72
1931 61 63 65 67 69 71 73
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Figure 3.  Health effects from the empirical model
Health
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Figure 4.  Health Status Trajectories by Insurance Group from Simulation*
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Figure 5. Health Status Trajectories by Insurance Group from Simulation* and from Raw Data
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Table 1.  Selection of Study Sample
Selection Criteria N Group excluded N Excluded
Total age eligible, cohorts 1931-1941 9,771
Survey wave for cohort at age 59/60  9,234 Age cohort 1931 537
Two survey waves for cohort before age 65  5,086 Age cohorts 1938-1941 4,148
Interviewed at age age 59/60 4,994 Deceased before age 59/60 92
4,860 Unobserved at age 59/60 134
Insurance status observed in 1992  4,805 No initial insurance status 55
Covered by Medicare after 65 4,774 Post-65 uninsured 31
More than one follow-up 4,647 No follow-ups 127
Not on Medicare or Medicaid at 59/60 4,075 Medicare or Medicaid at 59/60 572  
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Table 2.  Insurance Groups
Total Pre-Period Post-Period
Insurance Groups N Weighted % N Weighted % N Weighted %
Subjects
Insurance status at age 59/60
Insured 3484 85.5 3484 85.5 3256 86.0
Uninsured 591 14.5 591 14.5 524 14.0
Total 4075 100.0 4075 100.0 3780 100.0
    Observations
Insurance status at age 59/60
Insured 16511 85.7 10236 85.6 6275 86.0
Uninsured 2727 14.3 1712 14.4 1015 14.0
Total 19238 100.0 11948 100.0 7290 100.0  
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Table 3.  Baseline characteristics of insured and uninsured
Insured Uninsured P-value of
N=3484 N=591 difference*
Health Status
Excellent/Very good 54.9% 40.4% <0.001
Good 29.0% 30.0% 0.615
Fair/Poor 16.1% 29.6% <0.001
Male 48.2% 46.3% 0.394
Race
  White  86.2% 65.4% <0.001
  Black  7.7% 14.6% <0.001
  Hispanic  4.2% 15.8% <0.001
  Other 1.8% 4.2% <0.001
Education
  High school drop-out  17.6% 45.7% <0.001
  High school graduate 41.6% 32.9% <.0001
  Some college  20.0% 13.1% <0.001
  College graduate 20.8% 8.3% <0.001
Marital status
   Married 79.3% 68.6% <0.001
Single 3.1% 3.5% 0.665
Divorced/Separated 10.5% 16.3% <.0001
Widowed 7.1% 11.6% <0.001
Region
Midwest 26.8% 14.7% <0.001
Northeast 21.6% 16.7% 0.007
South 32.2% 45.9% <0.001
West 19.4% 22.7% 0.065
Total Assets
Negative 1.9% 7.9% <0.001
0-35,000 9.7% 32.6% <0.001
35,001-100,000 15.7% 16.8% 0.496
100,001-230,000 26.0% 17.0% <0.001
230,001 and above 46.7% 25.8% <0.001
Total Income
0-20,000 12.4% 48.0% <0.001
20,001-40,000 22.5% 25.1% 0.161
40,001-75,000 34.2% 15.1% <0.001
75,001 and above 31.0% 11.8% <0.001
Social Security Recipient 4.5% 7.6% 0.001
Retirement Status 
Not Retired 61.8% 57.6% 0.051
Fully Retired 20.1% 14.6% 0.002
Partly Retired 9.8% 10.1% 0.792
Not Applicable 8.3% 17.7% <.0001
*P-values for all group tests are significant at .05 level      32 
Table 4.  Multinomial Logit Regression of Health Status in t+1
Good vs. Exc/VG Fair/Poor vs. Exc/VG Dead vs. Exc/VG
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient
Health Status
     Good 1.89 <.001 2.28 <.001 1.49 <.001
     Fair/Poor 2.38 <.001 4.75 <.001 4.07 <.001
Uninsured 0.27 0.030 0.47 0.018 0.49 0.180
Post (Medicare)  -0.26 0.008 -0.16 0.304 -0.54 0.090
Uninsured*Health Status 
     Good  -0.26 0.208 -0.21 0.403 -0.01 0.992
     Fair/Poor -0.50 0.073 -0.67 0.045 -0.51 0.293
Post (Medicare)*Health Status 
     Good  -0.06 0.521 -0.08 0.633 0.53 0.130
     Fair/Poor 0.14 0.474 0.17 0.433 0.65 0.066
Uninsured*Post (Medicare)  -0.46 0.028 0.15 0.632 0.92 0.114
Uninsured*Post (Medicare)*Health Status 
     Good 0.36 0.295 -0.36 0.365 -1.30 0.098
     Fair/Poor 0.17 0.715 -0.64 0.183 -1.23 0.099
Age 0.07 <.001 0.08 <.001 0.07 0.053
Age*Age 0.00 0.561 0.01 0.030 -0.01 0.051
Male 0.08 0.069 0.17 0.002 0.70 <.001
Race/Ethnicity
     Black 0.28 <.001 0.41 <.001 0.40 0.004
     Hispanic 0.35 0.001 0.39 0.001 -0.30 0.182
     Other Race 0.45 0.013 0.22 0.237 -0.15 0.687
Education
     High School Graduate -0.27 <.001 -0.66 <.001 -0.44 0.001
     Some College -0.30 <.001 -0.85 <.001 -0.63 <.001
     College Graduate -0.52 <.001 -1.25 <.001 -0.86 <.001
Region
     Northeast -0.08 0.267 -0.08 0.370 0.04 0.816
     South -0.03 0.593 0.18 0.009 0.16 0.236
     West -0.24 0.001 0.07 0.442 0.01 0.971
P-value of the ￿² Tests on the set of coefficients representing the following Null Hypotheses:
Hypothesis: P-value
Upre = Ipre 0.095
Upost = Ipost 0.001
Upre = Upost 0.034
Ipre = Ipost 0.066
(Upost - Upre) = (Ipost - Ipre) 0.110
p-value
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   Table 5.  Predicted Probabilities of Health Status Changes Simulated between Age 65 and 71
U post  U pre I post  I pre  ￿U ￿I ￿U - ￿I
[A] - [B] [C] - [D] [E] - [F]
[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G]
N= 1015 (5.3%) 1712 (8.9%) 6275 (32.6%) 10236 (53.2%)
Excellent/VG -5.7 -13.4 -9.3 -15.2 7.7 5.9 1.8
(2.5, 12.3) (0.8, 8.9) (-2.6, 7.0)
Good -7.2 -1.1 -1.8 3.3 -6.1 -5.1 -1.0
(-13.5, -1.4) (-9.3, -1.5) (-7.2, 3.2)
Fair/Poor -2.4 1.3 3.0 4.0 -3.7 -1.0 -2.8
(-8.1, 3.6) (-4.1, 3.4) (-6.8, 3.2)
Dead 15.3 13.2 8.1 7.9 2.2 0.2 1.9
(-3.9, 7.5) (-2.7, 2.5) (-3.2, 6.5)
Adjusted for sex, age, education, ethnicity, race and region  
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Table 6.  Subgroup Analysis
U post  U pre I post  I pre  ￿U ￿I ￿U - ￿I
[A] - [B] [C] - [D] [E] - [F]
[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G]
1. Continous Insurance Status Subgroups
a.  Continuously Uninsured (U) vs. Continuously Insured (I)
N= 509 (3.0%) 886 (5.2%) 5925 (34.9%) 9665 (56.9%)
Excellent/VG -4.6 -12.2 -10.0 -16.0 7.6 6.0 1.6
(1.4, 12.8) (0.6, 9.5) (-3.7, 8.3)
Good -11.2 -4.4 -2.0 2.5 -6.8 -4.6 -2.3
(-14.2, -0.5) (-8.4, 0.0) (-9.5, 3.1)
Fair/Poor 1.8 2.6 3.8 5.7 -0.7 -1.9 1.2
(-8.1, 8.7) (-6.0, 2.3) (-5.3, 9.4)
Dead 13.9 13.9 8.2 7.8 -0.1 0.4 -0.5
(-6.7, 5.9) (-2.1, 3.1) (-7.1, 5.0)
b.  Continuously Uninsured (U) vs. Continuously Privately Insured (I)
N= 509 (3.2%) 886 (5.6%) 5500 (34.7%) 8976 (56.6%)
Excellent/VG -4.5 -11.7 -10.1 -16.4 7.3 6.3 0.9
(2.4, 14.0) (2.0, 11.1) (-5.0, 7.4)
Good -10.7 -4.1 -1.8 3.4 -6.6 -5.1 -1.4
(-14.3, 0.4) (-9.3, -0.4) (-9.1, 5.0)
Fair/Poor 1.8 4.3 4.3 6.3 -2.5 -2.0 -0.5
(-11.0, 5.3) (-6.4, 1.9) (-8.3, 6.7)
Dead 13.4 11.5 7.6 6.8 1.9 0.8 1.0
(-4.3, 9.0) (-2.2, 2.9) (-4.3, 8.7)
2. Sex Subgroups
a.  Female 
N= 562 (5.6%) 937 (9.3%) 3285 (32.6%) 5298 (52.6%)
Excellent/VG -3.5 -11.7 -9.5 -15.3 8.2 5.9 2.3
(-2.6, 13.1) (-4.5, 7.4) (-3.3, 11.4)
Good -6.3 0.6 -1.9 3.2 -6.8 -5.1 -1.7
(-14.9, 0.7) (-9.3, 1.9) (-10.2, 3.6)
Fair/Poor -3.3 0.3 2.8 3.6 -3.6 -0.9 -2.7
(-10.0, 6.7) (-3.4, 6.1) (-9.9, 4.5)
Dead 13.1 10.8 8.6 8.5 2.3 0.1 2.2
(-4.2, 8.6) (-3.6, 3.1) (-3.9, 8.3)
b.  Male
N= 453 (5.0%) 775 (8.5%) 2990 (32.7%) 4938 (53.9%)
Excellent/VG -6.7 -14.2 -9.4 -15.5 7.5 6.1 1.4
(3.5, 16.8) (3.5, 13.5) (-5.9, 8.4)
Good -8.2 -2.6 -1.8 3.4 -5.6 -5.2 -0.4
(-16.1, 0.2) (-11.9, -0.7) (-9.0, 6.1)
Fair/Poor -0.4 4.0 3.2 4.1 -4.4 -1.0 -3.4
(-12.2, 5.5) (-7.9, 3.1) (-8.7, 6.5)
Dead 15.3 12.8 8.1 7.9 2.5 0.1 2.4
(-7.8, 9.5) (-4.1, 3.3) (-6.5, 9.0)
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Table 6 (continued). Subgroup analysis 
3. Low Income and Wealth Subgroups
a.  Below Median Income 
N= 826 (8.8%) 1393 (14.8%) 2684 (28.5%) 4511(47.9%)
Excellent/VG -5.1 -12.4 -7.7 -13.4 7.3 5.7 1.6
(-2.6, 9.8) (-3.7, 6.9) (-3.2, 7.9)
Good -7.0 -1.3 -2.4 2.7 -5.7 -5.2 -0.6
(-14.0, -0.4) (-10.0, 0.4) (-9.1, 3.8)
Fair/Poor -3.1 0.7 1.9 2.8 -3.7 -1.0 -2.8
(-10.4, 4.5) (-2.9, 7.1) (-11.0, 1.4)
Dead 15.2 13.0 8.3 7.9 2.2 0.4 1.7
(-1.4, 11.7) (-3.4, 3.6) (-0.8, 10.9)
b.  Below Median Wealth 
N= 727 (7.6%) 1263 (13.3%) 2816 (29.6%) 4702 (49.5%)
Excellent/VG -5.7 -11.9 -8.6 -13.9 6.2 5.3 0.9
(2.3, 11.7) (1.7, 10.1) (-4.1, 6.3)
Good -7.0 -2.3 -2.8 2.0 -4.7 -4.8 0.1
(-8.8, 4.3) (-9.2, 1.8) (-5.0, 7.7)
Fair/Poor -3.6 0.1 2.2 3.1 -3.7 -0.9 -2.8
(-9.0, 6.0) (-5.2, 5.9) (-8.9, 4.6)
Dead 16.3 14.1 9.2 8.7 2.2 0.4 1.7
(-12.2, 4.4) (-9.3, 1.3) (-7.5, 7.2)
4. Medicare Supplemental Insurance Status Subgroups
a.  Medicare with No Supplemental Insurance
N= 579 (7.2%) 921 (11.4%) 2551 (31.6%) 4032 (49.9%)
Excellent/VG -9.0 -14.5 -11.6 -14.1 5.5 2.4 3.1
(-2.1, 13.3) (-4.3, 8.6) (-4.1, 10.7)
Good -10.2 2.2 -2.4 6.3 -12.4 -8.7 -3.6
(-21.2, -3.1) (-15.8, -2.0) (-11.1, 4.0)
Fair/Poor 3.0 12.3 4.3 7.7 -9.3 -3.5 -5.9
(-19.9, 1.8) (-10.9, 2.7) (-13.7, 3.0)
Dead 16.2 0.0 9.8 0.0 16.2 9.8 6.4
. (8.2, 21.2) .
b.  Medicare with Supplemental Insurance
N= 436 (4.1%) 651 (6.2%) 3724 (35.3%) 5736 (54.4%)
Excellent/VG -2.5 -8.8 -8.9 -15.1 6.3 6.2 0.1
(-3.2, 15.9) (-0.3, 12.8) (-8.3, 8.4)
Good -6.0 2.0 -1.8 7.0 -8.1 -8.8 0.8
(-20.0, 1.6) (-15.5, -2.9) (-9.2, 9.3)
Fair/Poor -6.8 6.8 2.7 8.1 -13.6 -5.4 -8.2
(-24.6, -2.6) (-12.5, 1.3) (-16.9, 1.4)
Dead 15.4 0.0 8.0 0.0 15.4 8.0 7.4
. (6.4, 17.2) .
c.  Medicare with Supplemental Insurance and pre-65 continuous private health insurance
N= 509 (5.2%) 819 (8.4%) 3277 (33.7%) 5106 (52.6%)
Excellent/VG -4.0 -10.4 -8.6 -13.4 6.3 4.8 1.6
(-0.7, 13.8) (-1.6, 10.8) (-5.4, 9.7)
Good -13.9 -6.0 -4.1 1.5 -7.9 -5.6 -2.3
(-17.7, -0.9) (-11.8, 0.5) (-10.7, 5.2)
Fair/Poor 2.9 16.4 5.1 11.8 -13.5 -6.7 -6.8
(-23.3, -1.9) (-13.7, -0.5) (-14.9, 4.0)
Dead 15.1 0.0 7.6 0.0 15.1 7.6 7.5
. (7.8, 18.3) .    36 
Table 7.  Sensitivity Analysis
U post  U pre  I post I pre  ￿U ￿I ￿U - ￿I
[A] - [B] [C] - [D] [E] - [F]
[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G]
1. Adding Potential Endogenous Covariates 
a.  Time-varying Retirement Status
Excellent/VG -5.4 -13.1 -9.2 -15.1 7.7 5.9 1.8
Good -7.5 -1.3 -1.8 3.3 -6.2 -5.1 -1.1
Fair/Poor -2.1 1.7 3.0 4.0 -3.7 -1.0 -2.7
Dead 14.9 12.8 8.0 7.9 2.2 0.2 2.0
b.  Time-varying Social Security Recipient Status
Excellent/VG -5.6 -13.3 -9.3 -15.2 7.7 5.9 1.8
Good -7.3 -1.2 -1.7 3.4 -6.1 -5.1 -1.0
Fair/Poor -2.5 1.2 2.9 3.9 -3.7 -1.0 -2.7
Dead 15.4 13.3 8.1 7.9 2.1 0.3 1.8
c. Time-varying Retirement Status, Social Security Recipient Status, and Marital Status
Excellent/VG -5.4 -12.9 -9.2 -15.0 7.6 5.8 1.7
Good -7.0 -1.3 -1.6 3.3 -5.8 -5.0 -0.8
Fair/Poor -2.5 1.5 2.9 3.9 -4.0 -1.0 -3.0
Dead 15.0 12.7 7.9 7.8 2.3 0.1 2.1
d.  Baseline Marital Status, Income, and Wealth
Excellent/VG -4.7 -12.6 -9.4 -15.3 7.8 6.0 1.8
Good -7.1 -0.9 -1.7 3.5 -6.2 -5.2 -1.0
Fair/Poor -2.8 0.9 2.9 3.8 -3.6 -1.0 -2.7
Dead 14.6 12.6 8.2 8.0 2.1 0.2 1.9
2. Alternative Age Specifications
a.  Linear Age
Excellent/VG -5.2 -12.4 -8.7 -14.3 7.3 5.6 1.7
Good -6.9 -0.6 -1.5 3.7 -6.2 -5.3 -1.0
Fair/Poor -4.3 -1.3 1.5 1.8 -3.0 -0.3 -2.7
Dead 16.3 14.3 8.7 8.8 2.0 -0.1 2.0
b.  Interaction of Age and Health Status
Excellent/VG -4.9 -12.5 -8.7 -14.5 7.6 5.8 1.8
Good -7.1 -1.4 -1.5 3.6 -5.7 -5.1 -0.5
Fair/Poor -4.2 -0.5 1.5 2.1 -3.8 -0.5 -3.2
Dead 16.2 14.3 8.7 8.8 1.9 -0.1 2.0
c.  Interaction of Age and Health Status, and Age-Squared and Health Status
Excellent/VG -5.8 -13.4 -9.3 -15.3 7.6 6.0 1.7
Good -7.3 -1.1 -1.8 3.3 -6.2 -5.1 -1.1
Fair/Poor -2.2 1.3 3.0 4.1 -3.6 -1.1 -2.5
Dead 15.4 13.2 8.1 7.9 2.2 0.2 1.9  
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Table 7 (continued). Sensitivity Analysis 
3. Alternative of Health Status Categorization
a.  Health Status: 5 Categories
Excellent -1.5 -4.3 -5.1 -4.7 2.8 -0.3 3.1
Very Good -3.9 -8.1 -4.5 -9.5 4.2 5.1 -0.8
Good -7.5 -2.4 -1.9 2.7 -5.2 -4.6 -0.6
Fair -1.7 -1.1 1.6 1.9 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3
Poor -0.6 3.0 1.7 2.1 -3.6 -0.4 -3.3
Dead 15.2 12.9 8.1 7.6 2.3 0.5 1.8
b.  Health Status 5 Categories Summarized as 3 Categories (E/VG, G, F/P)
Excellent/VG -5.4 -12.4 -9.5 -14.3 7.0 4.8 2.3
Good -7.5 -2.4 -1.9 2.7 -5.2 -4.6 -0.6
Fair/Poor -2.3 1.9 3.3 4.0 -4.2 -0.6 -3.5
Dead 15.2 12.9 8.1 7.6 2.3 0.5 1.8
4.  Sensitivity to Survey Weight
Excellent/VG -4.4 -10.4 -9.0 -14.1 6.1 5.0 1.0
Good -10.7 -4.5 -2.9 1.0 -6.3 -3.8 -2.4
Fair/Poor -1.3 1.2 3.0 4.5 -2.5 -1.5 -1.0
Dead 16.4 13.7 8.9 8.6 2.7 0.4 2.4
5.  Including People with Medicare/Medicaid at Age 59/60
Excellent/VG -4.4 -12.7 -8.0 -14.5 8.3 6.5 1.8
Good -7.8 -0.7 -1.9 2.9 -7.0 -4.8 -2.2
Fair/Poor -3.1 0.8 1.6 2.9 -3.9 -1.3 -2.6
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
 
In this technical appendix, we provide additional details about the data, the sample used, the 
specification of the model, and assorted sensitivity tests to verify the robustness of our results.    
 
Differential sample loss.  One of our early analyses indicated that there was differential sample 
loss for the initially uninsured from the initial cohort of the HRS.   For example, while the 
overall rate of loss to follow-up is 7.4% in the 1994 HRS (Baker and Sudano, 2005), we 
estimated this rate to be 6.7% among the insured and 13.8% among the uninsured. (Polsky et al., 
2005).  This dropout pattern continues in all survey waves and is not accounted for in HRS 
survey weights.  The respondent levels weights in the HRS are scaled so as to yield weight sums 
which correspond to the number of individuals in the U.S. population as measured by the March 
CPS for the year of data collection.  Existing HRS methodology involves post-stratifying each 
wave’s weights to the corresponding March CPS on the basis of age of respondent and spouse 
and on the basis of respondent gender and race/ethnicity.  Since insurance status was not factored 
into the weight estimation strategy by the HRS, we made additional adjustments to the 
respondent-level weights in the HRS so as to account for this differential dropout by insurance 
status in the HRS. 
 
To create additional weight adjustment factors for the HRS using the Current Population 
Survey’s (CPS) March supplement as a benchmark so that the weights would account for 
population level incidence of being uninsured we followed for following steps.  First, we created 
mutually exclusive categories within 4 dimensions related to insurance status: insurance 
categories defined as mutually exclusive insurance groups using hierarchical assignment 
(Employer/ Individual, Medicaid / Medicare / VA/Champus, Uninsured), race/ethnicity 
categories (White/Other (non-Hispanic), Black (non-Hispanic), All Hispanic), education 
categories (<high school degree, >=high school degree), and labor force participation categories 
(in labor force, not in labor force).  Second, for respondents at age 59/60 in the 1992, 1994, and 
1996 March CPS we estimated weighted and unweighted frequency counts for the 36 cells 
defined by: insurance groups * race* education * labor force status.  Cells smaller than n=20 
were collapsed.  Third, we similarly estimated weighted and unweighted counts for our study   39 
sample of 59/60 year olds in the 1992, 1994, and 1996 HRS for the 36 cells defined by insurance 
groups * race* education * labor force status.  Fourth, an adjustment factor was calculated as the 
ratio of the weighted CPS count to the weighted HRS count within each of the 36 cells.  Fifth, 
these insurance-race-education-labor force status- specific adjustment factors were applied to 
each individual’s HRS wave-specific weight in our study sample of 59/60 year olds in 1992, 
1994, or 1996.  Hence, by applying the adjustments, our study estimates from the HRS were 
benchmarked with the CPS.  
 
Design Effects.  For all of our subsequent analysis, we have adjusted for the design effects in the 
original study and for the differential sample loss by using these revised weights.  
 
We also correct for the panel nature of our data – repeated observations on individuals over a 
twelve year period.  In the estimation stage, and tests on the estimated equations, we use robust 
(Huber-White-Eicker) corrections appropriate to the estimator, and include cluster corrections at 
the person ID level using SAS SURVEYLOGIT procedure with the cluster option.  In predicting 
the trajectories from these estimates, we use estimates based on a clustered nonparametric 
bootstrapping of the data, where the clusters are all of the observations on an individual.   Each 
of the thousand replicates’ parameter estimates are used to make predictions based on a fixed 
reference sample.  That sample includes 100 copies of the values for our sample at age 59/60, 
with the weights equal to the weights at that age.  The reason for the additional copies was to 
reduce the extra variation induced by our Monte Carlo simulation of the trajectories for 
categorical health outcomes (see below).  
 
No formal correction is made for the clustering of observations by PSU’s in the Health and 
Retirement Study.   
 
Estimation approach to health transitions.  Because self-reported health status (augmented 
with being dead as the worst alternative) is an ordered categorical variable, one of the logical 
choices for analyzing the response in ordered data is either the ordered logit or the ordered 
probit.  In contrast, our multinomial approach does not exploit the information contained in the 
ordering.  In our sensitivity analyses, we examined the ordered logit and an extension, the   40 
generalized ordered logit (Williams, 2006).  The ordered logit estimator is highly restrictive in 
that it assumes proportional odds (or parallel lines).  The multinomial logit removes the ordering 
assumption between categories at the expense of increasing the number of parameters estimated.  
The generalized ordered logit model is a partial proportional odds model that preserves the 
information from ordering, but loosens the restrictive proportional odds assumption when it is 
violated.  In our case, the generalized ordered logit estimated the same number of parameters as 
the multinomial logit.  We use a Richard William’s gologit2 command in STATA for the partial 
proportional response model.  Although the formulation is slightly different, the model is 
equivalent to Lall et al. (2002) and Peterson and Harrell (1990).  
 
To test the proportional property of the ordered logit, we performed the Brant Test (Brant, 1990)   
The resulting test value in Appendix Table 1 indicates that we can reject the ordered logit at p < 
0.001; the proportionality assumption does not hold for these data.   Moreover, an examination of 
the specific contributors to the overall test value suggests that several key explanatory variables 
are involved, including initial health good and fair/poor and the specification of age, which is 
confounded with Medicare status.   The eliunin variable is a key violation given that it represents 
the interaction between Medicare eligibility and being uninsured at age 59/60.   
 
We also used other specification tests to assess the alternative estimators.  We employed the 
modified Hosmer–Lemeshow Test to determine whether there was a relationship between the 
raw-scale residuals (indicators for each status minus their predicted probability) against 
indicators for deciles of each of the predicted probabilities from these three models (ordered 
logit, generalized ordered logit, and multinomial).  We show the F-statistics from test of whether 
deciles of the predicted probability to determine if there is any systematic misfit in the 
predictions over the range of the data. If the specification is appropriate, we would expect that 
the raw-scale residuals would not be significantly different from zero as we move from low 
predicted values to high predicted values.  Appendix Table 2 and Appendix Figure 1 provide the 
results of these tests.  These tests suggest that the ordered logit does not fit these data well.  The 
ordered logit is unable to capture the movement to dead at the higher levels of predicted 
probabilities.  [Given the Brant test result above, part of this is the failure of the data to satisfy 
the proportionality assumption.]   The generalized ordered logit and the multinomial logit behave   41 
fairly well and yield similar predictions to each other.  They do not appear to be systematically 
biased over sub ranges of the data.  Given the similarity in predicted trajectories for the 
multinomial and the generalized ordered logit estimators, we decided to employ the multinomial 
model, because it is more widely known. At worst the price for this may be some loss of 
precision.  
 
We also assessed each of the estimators using appropriate extensions of Pregibon’s Link Test 
and the Ramsey’s RESET Test.  Our specification failed for all three estimators [Not shown].   
 
We also test the fit for the multinomial logit and the ordered logit (this command was 
unavailable for the generalized ordered logit) using the Log Likelihood, AIC and Schwartz 
criteria. See Appendix Table 3.   
 
Finally we provide the regression output for the ordered logit and the generalized ordered logit in 
Appendix Tables 4a and 4b.  This output is analogous to the multinomial regression which is 
Table 4 in the paper.   42 
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Appendix Figure 1: Revised Hosmer–Lemeshow Test
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Appendix Table 1.  Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption
Variable chi2     p>chi2  df 
All 594.15 <0.001 46
Health Status
     Good 84.63 <0.001 2
     Fair/Poor 95.01 <0.001 2
Uninsured 1.34 0.511 2
Post (Medicare)  1.98 0.372 2
Uninsured*Health Status 
     Good  0.88 0.644 2
     Fair/Poor 0.02 0.990 2
Post (Medicare)*Health Status 
     Good  4.3 0.116 2
     Fair/Poor 1.8 0.407 2
Uninsured*Post (Medicare)  12.43 0.002 2
Uninsured*Post (Medicare)*Health Status 
     Good 3.66 0.161 2
     Fair/Poor 3.54 0.170 2
Age 2.29 0.318 2
Age*Age 7.53 0.023 2
Male 28.38 <0.001 2
Race/Ethnicity
     Black 6.23 0.044 2
     Hispanic 20.63 <0.001 2
     Other Race 2.37 0.306 2
Education
     High School Graduate 14.43 0.001 2
     Some College 15.37 <0.001 2
     College Graduate 23.9 <0.001 2
Region
     Northeast 2.14 0.342 2
     South 8.66 0.013 2
     West 19.43 <0.001 2    45 

















Dead 0.548    46 
Appendix Table 3.  Measures of Fit for Alternative Estimation Approaches
Mlogit Ologit Gologit
Log-Lik Full Model: -15657 -15901 -15651
LR 8871 8383 8883
Prob > LR: <0.001 <0.001 <.001
McFadden' s Adj R2: 0.217 0.207 0.217
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2: 0.443 0.424 0.443
AIC*n: 31457 31853 31445
BIC' : -8197 -8158 -8209
AIC used by Stata: 31457 31853 31445    47 
Table 4a.  Coefficients from Ordered Logit
Coefficient P > |z|
Health Status
     Good 1.798 <0.001
     Fair/Poor 3.606 <0.001
Uninsured 0.345 0.001
Post (Medicare)  -0.162 0.043
Uninsured*Health Status 
     Good  -0.156 0.286
     Fair/Poor -0.394 0.007
Post (Medicare)*Health Status 
     Good  -0.015 0.860
     Fair/Poor 0.103 0.292
Uninsured*Post (Medicare)  -0.056 0.784
Uninsured*Post (Medicare)*Health Status 
     Good -0.081 0.754





     Black 0.257 <0.001
     Hispanic 0.159 0.017
     Other Race 0.135 0.219
Education
     High School Graduate -0.374 <0.001
     Some College -0.477 <0.001
     College Graduate -0.725 <0.001
Region
     Northeast -0.049 0.324
     South 0.070 0.085
     West -0.057 0.280
Constants
     Cut 1 0.541
     Cut 2 2.610
     Cut 3 5.494
P-value of the ￿² Tests on the set of coefficients representing 
the following Null Hypotheses:
Hypothesis:
Upre = Ipre 0.003
Upost = Ipost 0.003
Upre = Upost 0.153
Ipre = Ipost 0.074
(Upost - Upre) = (Ipost - Ipre) 0.627   48 
Table 4b.  Coefficients from Generalized Ordered Logit
Good vs. Exc/VG Fair/Poor vs. Exc/VG Dead vs. Exc/VG
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient
Health Status
     Good 1.95 <0.001 1.363 <0.001 0.528 0.012
     Fair/Poor 3.44 <0.001 3.494 <0.001 1.908 <0.001
Uninsured 0.31 0.003 0.419 0.013 0.635 0.074
-0.043 0.755 -0.370 0.232
Post (Medicare)  -0.26 0.003 -0.146 0.484 -0.153 0.756
Uninsured*Health Status 
     Good  -0.20 0.237 -0.146 0.484 -0.153 0.756
     Fair/Poor -0.42 0.081 -0.448 0.032 -0.500 0.220
Post (Medicare)*Health Status 
     Good  -0.04 0.704 0.021 0.880 0.594 0.084
     Fair/Poor 0.24 0.185 0.093 0.526 0.438 0.155
Uninsured*Post (Medicare)  -0.18 0.331 0.466 0.076 0.850 0.127
Uninsured*Post (Medicare)*Health Status 
     Good 0.04 0.881 -0.628 0.056 -1.072 0.152
     Fair/Poor -0.21 0.604 -0.702 0.034 -0.782 0.220
Age 0.07 <0.001 0.034 0.034 0.011 0.715
Age*Age 0.00 0.295 0.002 0.404 -0.013 0.007
Male 0.11 0.005 0.194 <0.001 0.594 <0.001
Race/Ethnicity
     Black 0.29 <0.001 0.263 <0.001 0.078 0.533
     Hispanic 0.32 0.001 0.098 0.272 -0.626 0.003
     Other Race 0.34 0.021 -0.117 0.479 -0.373 0.306
Education
     High School Graduate -0.36 <0.001 -0.489 <0.001 -0.028 0.823
     Some College -0.44 <0.001 -0.651 <0.001 -0.141 0.391
     College Graduate -0.70 <0.001 -0.913 <0.001 -0.264 0.148
Region
     Northeast -0.07 0.234 -0.029 0.690 0.105 0.495
     South 0.03 0.527 0.161 0.005 0.108 0.402
     West -0.18 0.004 0.171 0.023 0.042 0.799
P-value of the ￿² Tests on the set of coefficients representing the following Null Hypotheses:
Hypothesis: P-value
Upre = Ipre 0.047
Upost = Ipost <0.001
Upre = Upost 0.030
Ipre = Ipost 0.043
(Upost - Upre) = (Ipost - Ipre) 0.254
p-value
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Appendix Table 5. Comparison of the Extrapolation from the Three Models
U post at 71 U pre at 71 I post at 71 I pre at 71 ￿U ￿I Triple Dif
 - U at 65  - U at 65  - I at 65  - I at 65 [A] - [B] [C] - [D] [E] - [F]
[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] [G]
1.  Base model with multinomial logit - one simulation
Excellent/VG -3.8% -11.4% -10.4% -16.9% 7.6% 6.5% 1.1%
Good -7.6% -2.4% -0.4% 5.7% -5.2% -6.1% 0.9%
Fair/Poor -4.1% 1.1% 2.8% 3.7% -5.2% -0.9% -4.3%
Dead 15.5% 12.7% 8.0% 7.5% 2.8% 0.5% 2.3%
2.  Base model with ordered logit - one simulation
Excellent/VG -3.8% -9.4% -9.9% -14.9% 5.6% 5.0% 0.6%
Good -7.5% -8.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.9% -0.6% 1.5%
Fair/Poor -11.1% -8.4% 1.6% 4.8% -2.7% -3.2% 0.5%
Dead 12.4% 16.2% 8.2% 9.4% -3.8% -1.2% -2.5%
3.  Base model with gologit2 - one simulation
Excellent/VG -4.7% -11.6% -10.3% -16.5% 6.9% 6.2% 0.8%
Good -8.9% -2.5% -0.8% 4.3% -6.4% -5.1% -1.3%
Fair/Poor -2.7% 0.8% 3.1% 4.5% -3.5% -1.4% -2.1%
Dead 16.2% 13.3% 7.9% 7.7% 2.9% 0.2% 2.7%  